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CLASS RETREAT FROM MASS DECEIT:
ASSESSING CLASS ACTION COMPATIBILITY
WITH TRUTH IN LENDING ACT RESCISSION
Jeffrey A. Payne*
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) provides two primary civil remedies
for aggrieved borrowers who received misleading loan disclosures:
damages and rescission. While the damages remedy expressly caps
class-action damages recoveries, TILA's rescission remedy is
completely silent as to class-action treatment. Despite a split on the
district-court level regarding the applicability of the class-action device
to TILA rescission, the only two federal Circuit Courts of Appeal to
consider the issue have foreclosed the right of borrowers to seek class-
wide rescissory relieffor TILA disclosure errors. This Article examines
the judicial analysis in these two cases and finds that both courts
erroneously construed TILA rescission in favor of lender rights and
overstepped their constitutionally delegated power by completely
foreclosing a right absent clear congressional intent.
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INTRODUCTION
Meet the Andrews family. Bryan Andrews is self-employed, and
his income varies monthly. Bryan and his wife, Susan, know a fair
amount about mortgages, having taken out several for residential and
investment properties. The Andrews family has good credit, a
traditional thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage with a reasonable interest
rate of 5.75 percent, and two children nearing college age. In June
2004, a lender approaches the Andrews family touting a unique loan-
refinancing product with multiple payment options. The lender tells
Mr. Andrews that such a loan will provide tremendous flexibility in
monthly payments, which would be a perfect fit for a self-employed
man putting his children through college. More importantly, the loan
documents also profess a tempting 1.95 percent annual percentage
rate (APR) and fixed monthly payments of $700 for five years. The
monthly payments will readjust to a fully amortizing amount at the
end of the five-year period or if the outstanding loan balance
negatively amortizes to exceed 110 percent of the original loan
amount before then. The Andrewses, beside themselves over the
supposed bargain that just fell into their laps, accept the refinance
loan offered by the lender.
In August 2004, two months after closing, the Andrews family
realizes something is wrong. According to the Andrewses' second
monthly statement, their interest rate has more than doubled from
1.95 percent to 4.375 percent. While confused, they figure the loan is
still a good one; the payments remain fixed, and the interest rate
appears to remain lower than that of their original mortgage.
However, by February 2006, the Andrews family's interest rate
has soared to 7.5 percent, which constitutes a 385 percent increase
from the initial teaser rate advertised less than two years ago. Before
the Andrewses' first child has completed college, their low, fixed
monthly payments combined with ever-increasing interest rates have
pulled their loan principal to the 110 percent negative amortization
point. Suddenly the Andrews family's payments have increased to
nearly $1,000, and the life of the loan has been extended by years.
Not only are the Andrewses having trouble paying tuition, but they
are also in serious danger of losing their home.
[Vol. 43:12071210
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Roughly based on the facts of a recent Seventh Circuit case,'
this scenario represents an unfortunately common dilemma facing
many borrowers. Realizing they had been deceived into a risky loan,
the Andrewses brought suit in federal district court seeking a judicial
declaration that the misleading disclosure they received from the
lender entitled them to rescind their loan. Like several borrowers
before them, the Andrewses sought relief for themselves and for the
nearly seven thousand similarly situated borrowers convinced to take
the same or similar loan products. Also like some of the borrowers
bringing such cases, the Andrews family was successful at the trial
level. On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit became the second
federal circuit court to overturn such a victory, thereby foreclosing
the right of borrowers in the Seventh Circuit to seek rescission on a
class-wide basis.
The Andrews case illustrates an emerging trend in the treatment
of Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims brought by a class of
aggrieved borrowers. It also begs the issue of why courts failed to
help stem mortgage disclosure violations that ultimately contributed
to the current home mortgage crisis. One reason was that many
courts shied away from granting class-wide rescission as a remedy
for systemic TILA violations, invoking substantive and procedural
reasoning that showed remarkable deference to lenders' unsupported
claims. Substantively, these courts accepted arguments that lenders
would face "crushing liability" if rescission were granted on a class-
wide basis2 despite the lack of factual evidence to support that
conclusion. In addition to lacking a factual basis, this lender
argument lacks a statutory basis. Although TILA's damages
provision allows courts to consider a lender's resources in
determining a class-action damages award, the statute nowhere
makes "crushing liability" a defense to disclosure violations. To the
contrary, forcing consumers to bear the risk of loss for inadequate
disclosure of the terms of a loan is contrary to the consumer-
protection purpose of TILA.' By allowing this new defense to class
certification for TILA disclosure violations, the courts have enabled
lenders to continue violating the law.
1. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2008).
2. McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 426 (1st Cir. 2007).
3. See infra Part I.A.
Summer 2010] 1211
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Procedurally, courts have also accepted the argument that class-
wide rescission is incompatible with the class-action device because
rescission is a purely personal remedy intended to operate privately
between the lender and the debtor. Yet borrowers are not generally
seeking outright class-wide rescission in TILA-disclosure-violation
cases. Rather, they typically request a class-wide judicial declaration
that an infirmity in the lenders' standardized documents common to
all members of the class entitles each class member individually to
seek rescission ("declaration of rescindability").4 Although each
member who subsequently chooses to rescind would require
individualized judicial attention, the determination of the right to
rescind itself is a fact-intensive analysis common to the class. A
class-wide judicial determination of rescindability would be more
efficient in light of the thousands of consumers who received
identical standardized disclosures than would multiple identical suits
brought by individual consumers.
Part I of this Article advances the purposes and policies behind
TILA and details TILA's rescission remedy. Part II outlines the
development of a judicial split at the federal trial level on whether to
certify class actions for TILA rescission. Part III demonstrates that
attempts so far to divine congressional intent from the text of TILA's
rescission remedy ignore the plain language of the statute. Moreover,
even if courts do find the language of TILA ambiguous, evidence
beyond the statutory text lends strong support to the notion that the
class-action device is compatible with TILA rescission. Part IV
weighs courts' asserted concerns regarding lender liability in class-
certified TILA rescission against the benefits of rescission in this
context and finds that the latter outweigh the former. Part V analyzes
possible procedural barriers to TILA rescission actions based on
standing and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23 ("Rule 23")
and proposes that TILA rescission claims are appropriate in federal
court under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). The Article concludes that it is
beyond the proper scope of judicial power to preclude class-action
amenability to rescission entirely. Instead, the separation of powers
doctrine dictates that it is the courts' duty to apply the law as written
4. See, e.g., Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612, 621 (E.D. Wis. 2007),
rev'd, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008).
1212 [Vol. 43: 1207
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and allow Congress to address any perceived flaws in the statutory
scheme.
I. TILA RESCISSION'S PURPOSE AND THE DEVELOPING
FORECLOSURE OF TILA CLASS ACTION RESCISSION RIGHTS
Congress enacted TILA to give borrowers a more meaningful
basis to shop for and compare available various credit options.'
TILA requires lenders to disclose accurately and uniformly the costs
inherent in borrowing, and it provides civil and criminal remedies as
a means of enforcement. TILA's rescission provision attempts to
deter and remedy certain TILA disclosure violations by allowing
borrowers to cancel their loans, thereby returning each party to the
position it occupied prior to the transaction. Unlike TILA's damages
remedy, however, TILA's provision regarding rescission is silent as
to the applicability of the class-action device. While some district
courts have certified TILA rescission classes, the only two circuit
courts to review such certifications have held that Rule 23 class
actions cannot be used to obtain TILA rescission.
A. The Truth in Lending Act: Purposes and Remedies
Prior to the enactment of TILA,' consumers experienced a great
deal of confusion regarding the cost of credit. Lenders' inconsistent
disclosures and wildly variable methods of computing interest made
it nearly impossible for consumers to understand the true cost of
credit, much less compare the terms of credit offered by different
lenders in the marketplace.' As a result, Congress enacted TILA in
1968 to protect consumers against the uninformed use of credit by
requiring a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that consumers
could more readily compare the various credit terms available in the
marketplace.!
TILA imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of lenders to
disclose the cost and relevant terms of obtaining credit to
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
6. Congress enacted TILA in 1968. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006 & Supp. II 2008)). Congress
authorized the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations that would carry out the purposes of
TLA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a). The Board responded by promulgating Regulation Z. See 12
C.F.R. pt. 226 (2009).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
Summer 2010] 1213
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consumers.' Congress did not design TILA to limit what a creditor
could charge, but rather to promote uniformity in the disclosure and
computation of credit terms."o TILA achieves this aim by demanding
clear and conspicuous disclosure of the APR and the finance
charges" upon which the APR is based. The APR expresses the total
annual cost of borrowing in a uniform way to enable consumers to
comparison shop more easily between loans.12
To incentivize lender compliance and consumer enforcement of
the law, TILA offers consumers two primary civil 3 remedies for
TILA violations: damages" and rescission." Section 1640 of TILA
provides a private right of action for aggrieved mortgage borrowers
to seek actual damages plus statutory damages between $400 and
$4,000.'6 However, monthly mortgage payments are often close to, if
not more than, $1,000 a month. If a lender sells a borrower an
unaffordable loan by providing a loan disclosure with certain
deceptive material loan terms, a single $4,000 damages award-the
statutory maximum-could amount to a handful of monthly
9. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1040, at 1.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Regulation Z defines a finance charge as "any charge payable directly or indirectly by
the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of
the extension of credit." 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a). The finance charge as defined by Regulation Z is
quite broad and encompasses not only interest, but also service charges; points; appraisal,
investigation, and other report fees; and various other charges involved in the extension of credit.
Id. § 226.4(b).
12. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 744 (2006) ("The APR is intended to express the
total annual cost of borrowing ... so that borrowers can comparison price shop between a loan
with a higher interest rate but lower up-front costs and a loan with lower initial costs but a higher
interest rate.").
13. TILA also subjects lenders to criminal penalties of a fine of up to $5,000, or
imprisonment up to one year, or both for willful and knowing violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1611.
However, criminal penalties have largely failed as an effective TILA enforcement tool. See, e.g.,
Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-Regulation, 57
BUFF. L. REv. 1361, 1435 (2009).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1640.
15. Id. § 1635. Non-purchase-money security interests in a borrower's principal dwelling
include, for example, home-improvement loans, home-equity lines of credit, and refinancing
transactions with a lender other than the original lender. See id. § 1635(e) (exempting "residential
mortgage transaction[s]" and transactions "constitut[ing] a refinancing or consolidation ... of an
existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same property"); 12
C.F.R. § 226.23(f) (same).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. II 2008); see also ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN
KEEST, TRUTH IN LENDING § 8.6.2.2, at 596 (6th ed. 2007) ("TILA provides a $[4]00 floor and a
$[4],000 ceiling on statutory damages for transactions secured by real estate or a dwelling .... ).
1214 [Vol. 43:1207
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payments towards a loan the borrower otherwise still must pay. This
will not significantly improve the situation and will therefore fail to
provide any true incentive for the borrower to take remedial action
against the lender. Moreover, the statute of limitations on TILA
damages is only one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation." For many borrowers, it can be difficult to determine that
a legal right, such as the right to rescind, exists within one year.
Consequently, Congress implemented an alternate remedy for
consumers under TILA-the right to rescission.
B. The TILA Rescission Remedy
TILA provides borrowers with the right to rescind loans
involving a non-purchase-money security interest in the borrower's
principal dwelling." Unlike damages, which can only provide
limited relief, "[r]escission under TILA is potentially a highly
effective means for a consumer ensnared in a bad loan to avoid its
worst effects, which may include bankruptcy, and even loss of one's
home through foreclosure.""
Regardless of the clarity or accuracy of the underlying loan
terms, every borrower of eligible loans begins with an unqualified
right to rescind the loan for the first three days after closing.20 This is
commonly referred to as the initial three-day "cooling off' period.2'
TILA's three-day rescission right can extend for up to three years if a
lender fails to provide the borrower with clear notice of the three-day
right to rescind or if the lender fails to provide the borrower with
accurate material disclosures,22 although minor errors are tolerated.2 3
Importantly, TILA rescission not only puts the borrower in the
position she would have been in had the loan not been made, but it
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
18. Id. § 1635(a).
19. Robert Murken, Can't Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home Equity
Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 457, 457 (2004).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(l)-(3).
21. See, e.g., Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna
v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). Regulation Z defines "material
disclosures" as "the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the
amount financed, the total payments, [and] the payment schedule. . . ." 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3)
n.48.
23. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d)(1)(i) (treating the disclosed finance charge as accurate as long
as it is not understated by more than a $100 tolerance level).
1215Summer 2010]
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also serves as a significant deterrent by forcing the lender to disgorge
all benefits if it fails to comply with TILA.24 The lender must return
to the borrower all fees and interest paid as of the date of rescission.
However, TILA rescission can be largely ineffective against
predatory lending on an individual basis because most borrowers will
be unaware of their right to rescind for inaccurate TILA
disclosures.2 ' This is because the TILA-mandated disclosure itself,
which explains the borrower's right to rescind, is too complicated for
the average borrower to understand. 26 Even if the lender gives the
borrower the required notice of the right to rescind, that notice only
discusses the three-day absolute right to rescission, not the three-year
extended right to rescind for incorrect material disclosures.27 Class
actions for TILA rescission could inform potentially misled
borrowers of this three-year extended right to rescission. TILA
rescission in a class-action context could therefore serve as a
powerful tool to combat the TILA violations that contributed to the
foreclosure crisis.
C. TILA Class Actions
Congress expressly approved the use of Rule 23 class actions by
borrowers to redress TILA violations common to the class and has
only ruled out class-action recovery for minor, technical TILA
violations. As initially enacted in 1968, TILA was entirely silent as
to the compatibility of Rule 23 class actions with TILA remedies.
Enacted as part of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,28 Rule 23
provides background procedural law applicable to any new
substantive statute, including TILA. Explicit consideration of the
class-action device did not appear until Congress enacted an
amendment to TILA in 1974 ("1974 Amendment"). 29 Spurred by a
desire "to protect small business firms from catastrophic judgments"
as a result of class-wide recovery of the statutory-minimum damages
24. Murken, supra note 19, at 458.
25. See id at 461--63.
26. Id.
27. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 app. H-8.
28. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2006)).
29. Act of October 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
1216 [Vol. 43:1207
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award for technical disclosure errors,30 Congress used the 1974
Amendment to cap damages recoverable in a class action to the
lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the creditor's net worth.'
However, no similar cap was added to TILA's rescission remedy.
Notably, the 1974 Amendment did not create a class-action right
under TILA. Instead, Congress's first mention of TILA's class-action
compatibility appeared as a cap rather than an affirmative grant,
demonstrating that Congress merely intended to limit a previously
conferred right.32
TILA's $100 minimum-statutory-damages provision (now
$400)33 was designed to encourage enforcement by private
litigation.34 However, Congress apparently did not foresee the
problem that class actions could present when each class member
would be entitled to at least $100. Congress therefore created the
1974 Amendment to maintain the private incentive to enforce
TILA's provisions without rendering such enforcement unduly
burdensome for creditors.35 Congress later raised the cap in a 1976
amendment 6 from $100,000 to $500,000 in order to increase the
award's deterrent effect on creditors (although Congress has not
30. H.R. REP. No. 93-1429, at 37 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6148, 6153 (emphasis added); see S. REP. No. 93-278, at 14-15 (1973) ("The purpose of the civil
penalties section under [TILA] was to provide creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply
with the law without relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy. However, the Committee feels
this objective can be achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties for violations
which do not involve actual damages and may be ofa technical nature. Putting a reasonable limit
on a creditor's maximum class action liability would seem to be in the best interests of both
creditors and consumers." (emphasis added)).
31. Act of October 28, 1974 sec. 408, § 1640(a), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518.
32. Nicholas G. Maclnnis, Commercial and Consumer Credit Law-Class Action Remedy
Unavailable in First Circuit for Plaintifs Seeking Rescission Under Truth in Lending Act-
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007), 41 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 321, 327-28 (2008); see also Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 371 (3d Cir.
2000) ("Though the statute clearly contemplates class actions, there are no provisions within the
law that create a right to bring them . . . . The 'right' to proceed to a class action, insofar as the
TILA is concerned, is a procedural one that arises from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 2008).
34. See, e.g., Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1181 (11th Cir. 1982);
Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1410 (1974) [hereinafter Class
Actions Under TILA].
35. See Class Actions Under TILA, supra note 34, at 1410.
36. Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257. The statute currently
provides that in the case of a class action for damages, "the total [damages] recovery under this
subparagraph in any class action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to
comply by the same creditor shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the
net worth of the creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
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adjusted that figure to account for inflation since that amendment's
enactment)."
In 1995, Congress reacted again to concerns about lender
liability for technical TILA violations following the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Company.38 In Rodash,
the court held that the lender's failure to include a $22 express-
delivery charge and a $204 intangible state tax as part of the finance
charge violated TILA because they were material disclosures under
the statute. 39 The practical result of the Rodash decision was to open
the door to TILA remedies for minor technical disclosure errors. In
the context of home loans, which are often in excess of $100,000,
Congress's concern was that Rodash would enable borrowers to
obtain a windfall by bringing suit for statutory damages or rescission
based on harmless disclosure errors. Indeed, over fifty class-action
suits were filed shortly after Rodash, the majority of which sought
TILA's rescission remedy.40
Fearing for the liquidity of the mortgage market should these
claims proceed, Congress enacted a six-month moratorium on class
actions so that it had time to craft a solution. 41 During that time,
Congress considered various proposals to limit damages and the right
to rescission.4 2 However, in a TILA amendment enacted later that
year ("1995 Amendment"), Congress ultimately chose only to
increase the TILA-violation tolerance level for understated finance
charge disclosures from $10 to $100.43 Therefore, with full
37. S. REP. No. 94-590, at 8 (1976) ("The recommended $500,000 limit, coupled with the
1% formula, provides, we believe, a workable structure for private enforcement. Small businesses
are protected by the 1% measure, while a potential half million dollar recovery ought to act as a
significant deterrent to even the largest creditor."). Since 1976, the $500,000 cap has been left
untouched, despite the fact that the value of 500,000 1976 dollars in 2010 is $1,915,738.14. CPI
Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Jul. 21, 2010). Furthermore,
banks have grown significantly in size since 1976. In this light, 500,000 2010 dollars likely do
not have the deterrent effect on large lenders that Congress intended when it enacted the 1976
Amendment. a
38. Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
39. Id. at 1147.
40. 141 CONG. REC. 26896 (1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
41. Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, sec. 2, § 1640(i),
109 Stat. 161, 161-62; see also 141 CONG. REC. 11171-72 (statements of Sens. Mack, D'Amato,
and Bond).
42. See 141 CONG. REC. 26897 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
43. Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, sec. 3, § 1605(f), 109
Stat. 271, 272-76.
[Vol. 43:12071218
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knowledge of dozens of pending class-action TILA-rescission cases,
Congress elected not to ban such actions." Instead, Congress raised
the tolerance level for which a TILA-disclosure error would merit
liability, whether in the form of damages or rescission. Moreover,
Congress's motive here was not to limit lender liability for violations
of TILA broadly, but rather to create a safe harbor from massive
lender liability for minor disclosure errors affecting material
disclosure figures by less than $100.45
D. Emerging Trends in Judicial Treatment of
Class-Wide TILA Rescission
Early TILA jurisprudence addressing rescission in a class-wide
context involved consumers bringing claims for wholesale rescission
en masse for all putative class members.46 In these cases, the class
representatives sought the rescission remedy for a TILA-disclosure
infirmity shared by all class members who received identical
standardized loan documents. But TILA requires a borrower to give
the lender notice of any decision to rescind individually;" therefore,
the putative class members may not yet have had a justiciable case or
controversy for which automatic rescission would provide redress.
Furthermore, there is a possibility that some, if not many, of the
putative class members did not want to rescind their individual loans,
and might have chosen a damages remedy for the TILA violations
they suffered. As such, a court ruling in favor of the named plaintiff
might not favor class members who did not wish to rescind their
loans.
Subsequent class-wide rescission claimants have sought a
modified remedy to circumvent the lender's lack of notice of each
individual borrower's invocation of rescission and the borrower's
44. The 1995 Amendment makes explicit Congress's intention not to limit the right of
rescission in any way: "This legislation that we are considering here today addresses the Rodash
problem by exempting a number of charges from inclusion in the finance charge and provides a
tiered tolerance approach on finance charge miscalculations. The bill does not extend any
exemptions from the right of rescission." 141 CONG. REC. 26575 (statement of Rep. Roukema).
45. 141 CONG. REc. 11172 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("The potential for massive
rescissions, based on technical disclosures [sic] errors of as little as $10, creates a potential for
liability that has been estimated to be as high as $217 billion.").
46. See James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, Inc., 621 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1980); Mayo v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 148 F.R.D. 576 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Nelson v. United Credit Plan, Inc., 77
F.R.D. 54 (E.D. La. 1978).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).
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election of rescission over a damages award. Rather than asking for a
declaration of rescission for all putative class members, these suits
pursue a declaration of the right to rescind.48 The difference between
this type of claim and a declaration of rescindability is that the
named plaintiff does not seek a declaration of rescission for the class
members en masse. Instead, the class representative asks the court
for a declaration of rescindability for each class member for three
years after closing because of a common TILA violation in the loan
documents tendered at closing. Such a declaration occurs after the
liability stage of the litigation-a fact-intensive analysis of whether
the lender had committed a TILA violation triggering the right of
rescission for all borrowers in the class. This would not rescind every
borrower's loan but instead declare that every borrower has an
assertable right to rescind her loan. Those borrowers who choose to
pursue such a right can then assert it as part of the relief phase of the
litigation, as long as the right is asserted within the statutory three-
year window beginning at the time the borrowers entered into the
transaction.49
48. Federal district courts are divided on whether this approach should be allowed to
proceed. For district courts granting class certification for declarations of rescindability, see In re
Ameriquest Mortgage Co. Mortgage Lending Practices Litigation, No. 05-CV-7097, 2007 WL
1202544 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2007); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612 (E.D.
Wis. 2007), rev'd, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.,
429 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2006), rev'd, 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007); Rodrigues v. Members
Mortgage Co., 226 F.R.D. 147 (D. Mass. 2005); Latham v. Residential Loan Centers ofAmerica,
No. 03 C 7094, 2004 WL 1093315 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2004); McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank &
Trust Co., 215 F.R.D. 26 (D. Mass. 2003); Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428
(E.D. Pa. 1998); and Hickey v. Great Western Mortgage Corp., 158 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
For courts denying class certification, including federal circuit courts, see Andrews v. Chevy
Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475
F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007); Murray v. America's Mortgage Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03 C 6186,
2005 WL 1323364 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Gibbons v. Interbank Funding Group, 208 F.R.D. 278 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); and Jefferson v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
Currently only one state appellate court has considered this issue. In LaLiberte v. Pacific
Mercantile Bank, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 751 (Ct. App. 2007), the California Court of Appeal
affirmed a trial court's denial of class certification.
49. See, e.g., Williams, 183 F.R.D. at 435 ("{T]hc instant case is distinguishable from cases
in which courts have refused to certify a class which sought rescission as a remedy in that, in this
case, plaintiffs do not seek to rescind each contract as a remedy. Rather, plaintiffs only seek a
declaration that the notices of rescission in the sales and financing contracts violate TILA, and
thus that each member of the class is entitled to seek rescission. Should the Court declare that,
indeed, plaintiffs are entitled to seek rescission because of certain infirmities in the TILA
disclosure documents, then each class member, individually, and not as a member of the class,
would have the option to exercise his or her right to seek rescission.").
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The first case dealing with declaration of rescindability to reach
the appellate level was McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan
Corp."o The plaintiff-borrowers in McKenna alleged that the forms
tendered by defendant First Horizon at closing had inaccurately
disclosed the borrowers' statutory right to rescind." In addition to
claims for individual relief, the borrowers asserted that First
Horizon's practices had affected "countless others" and sought a
class-wide "declaration that any class member who elected to do so
could rescind his or her credit transaction with First Horizon at any
time during the extended three-year statutory default period."52
The borrowers succeeded in the district court," but the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,54 becoming the first
circuit court to foreclose class-wide declarations of rescindability
under TILA. The First Circuit held that Congress had not intended
class actions to be a vehicle for rescission under TILA because it was
"nose-on-the-face plain that unrestricted class action availability for
rescission claims would open the door to vast recoveries."" In
coming to this conclusion, the court acknowledged the 1976 damages
cap and stated that "[t]he notion that Congress would limit liability to
$500,000 with respect to one remedy while allowing the sky to be
the limit with respect to another remedy for the same violation
strains credulity." 56 The court grounded its holding further on the
notion that rescission is a "personal remedy" incompatible with the
class-action device and should be available only to individuals on a
case-by-case basis.
Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank" is the second case-and the
only other circuit decision to date-to address whether a declaration
of rescindability is available in a TILA class action.59 The U.S. Court
50. 475 F.3d 418.
51. Id. at 420.
52. Id.
53. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d 291.
54. McKenna, 475 F.3d at 427.
55. Id at 424.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 423-25.
58. 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008).
59. The California Court of Appeal is currently the only state appellate court to have
considered this issue and accords with the First and Seventh Circuits in holding that plaintiff-
borrowers cannot assert class claims for TILA rescission. See LaLiberte v. Pac. Mercantile Bank,
53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745 (Ct. App. 2007).
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Andrews court largely followed
the McKenna court's lead, quoting the McKenna language
throughout its own opinion. The Andrews court relied heavily on the
assertion that TILA rescission is a purely personal remedy of a
character that "makes it procedurally and substantively unsuited to
deployment in a class action."6 0 Like McKenna, Andrews relied on §
1640(a)(2)(B)'s cap on statutory damages to find that "the absence of
a similar cap in § 1635 strongly suggests that class actions are not
available for rescission."61
The Andrews court also suggested an alternative procedural
rationale "that the fundamental incompatibility between the
rescission remedy under TILA and the class-action device raises
serious questions as to whether a TILA rescission class could ever be
properly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)."62
While this observation is only dicta, it reflects an ongoing debate at
the trial level as to whether class actions for declarations of
rescindability comply with Rule 23.6
The court decided McKenna in 2006, just before the mortgage
crisis took hold of the nation and the folly of putting so many
Americans into mortgages they poorly understood became clear.
Andrews was decided in 2008 but largely tracked the McKenna
decision. Now that the devastating effects of borrowers' lack of
knowledge about the terms of their home loans have been seen, we
are at an opportune moment to reconsider the operation of TILA,
including the rescission remedy's application to class-wide
declaratory relief.
60. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 574. The court also linked TILA rescission to equitable rescission
and commented that "[r]escission is a highly individualized remedy as a general matter, and
rescission under TILA is no exception." Id.
61. Id. at 575.
62. Id. at 576.
63. Currently, there is still a wide split at the district-court level on the issue of class
certification for declarations of rescindability. Nevertheless, as a likely result of the current
agreement among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court has thus far denied certiorari in two cases
seeking a final review of the controversy. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 129 S. Ct. 2864
(2009); LaLiberte v. Pac. Mercantile Bank, 552 U.S. 951 (2007).
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II. TILA RESCISSION'S COMPATIBILITY WITH
RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY
LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Is TILA's rescission right compatible with the class-action
device? As with any question of statutory interpretation, courts must
start with the statutory text. To the extent that the text may be
opaque, courts may then move to congressional history and intent in
writing the statute as Congress did.' Here, although a careful reading
indicates that both inquiries lean toward a finding that Congress
authorized class-wide declarations of the right to TILA rescission,
the courts have not interpreted the plain meaning of the statute or the
congressional history and intent in this manner. However, to deter
the TILA violations that have plagued the mortgage market in recent
years, courts must uniformly embrace Congress's language and
intent when interpreting TILA.
A. Statutory Interpretation Principles Support
Rule 23 Compatibility with TILA Rescission
The rules of statutory construction require courts to start with
the text of the statute before considering legislative history and
intent." If the court finds no ambiguities in the plain meaning of the
statutory language, then it must presume that Congress expressed its
intent in that language and cease further inquiry.66 The court must
determine the clarity or ambiguity of the statutory language by
examining "the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.""
An investigation of TILA's statutory language and the context in
which it is used reveals no ambiguity regarding class-action pursuit
of TILA rescission.
64. E.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("Where ... resolution of a question of
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language
and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.").
65. Id.
66. E.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 578 (7th Cir.
2008) (Evans, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must start with the language of the statute itself If the statute
is unambiguous, it controls, and a court has no business substituting its view of good policy for
that of Congress. Indeed, unambiguous language must be given effect unless it produces results
that are 'absurd."' (citing Evans ex rel. Evans v. Lederle Labs., 167 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir.
1999); United States v. Thomas, 77 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996))).
67. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
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Nothing in TILA's text expressly precludes the use of class
actions to obtain a declaration that an infirmity in the tendered loan
document common to all class members entitles each member of the
class to seek rescission on an individual basis.6" Indeed, the majority
of district courts certifying TILA-rescission classes have expressly
relied on this observation in their analysis.69 Moreover, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure make class actions available in any federal
civil suit absent a direct expression by Congress to the contrary. 0
68. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612, 621 (E.D. Wis. 2007), rev'd, 545
F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 291, 303
(D. Mass. 2006), rev'd, 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co.,
226 F.R.D. 147, 153 (D. Mass. 2005); Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 436
(E.D. Pa. 1998)); see also In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 05-
CV-7097, 2007 WL 1202544, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2007) ("Plaintiffs are simply seeking a
declaration to facilitate their respective pursuits of an individual remedy, and neither the plain
language of TILA nor Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 prohibits plaintiffs from doing so on a class-wide
basis.").
69. See, e.g., In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 2007 WL
1202544, at *3; Andrews, 240 F.R.D. at 621; McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 303; Rodrigues, 226
F.R.D. at 153; McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust, Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (D. Mass.
2003); Williams, 183 F.R.D. at 435-36. The only other case certifying a class action, Hickey v.
Great Western Mortgage Corp., 158 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Ill. 1994), failed to address statutory-
construction principles and instead decided the case on the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
23 elements alone.
70. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979). The Andrews and McKenna courts both
dismissed Yamasaki's applicability to § 1635 by distinguishing it from the statute at issue in
Yamasaki. As the Andrews court explained,
Yamasaki concerned a statute setting forth the procedure by which judicial
review of an administrative decision could be obtained, [42 U.S.C. §
405(g)]. The Court rejected the argument that the statute's language
authorizing a suit for judicial review by "any individual" meant that
individual suits only-not class actions-could be brought. The Court held
that this "any individual" language, without more, did not preclude the use
of class actions in this category of suit.
Andrews, 545 F.3d at 575 (citing Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 698-700). The courts that decided
Andrews and McKenna both explained that "TILA's rescission remedy 'is written with the goal of
making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the
intervention of the courts."' Andrews, 545 F.3d at 575 (quoting Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA,
412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005)); McKenna, 475 F.3d at 425 (same). Section 405(g), on the other
hand, was a "jurisdictional statute specifying the rules by which judicial review may be sought."
Andrews, 545 F.3d at 575. Therefore, these courts argued, the differences between the statutes
indicate that the lack of an express prohibition against class actions in § 1635 is not dispositive.
However, this analysis appears to give "unduly short shrift" to the Court's mandate in Yamasaki.
RENUART & KEEST, supra note 16, § 6.9.9, at 487. Both courts ignored the broader context in
which the Court stated its rule:
In the absence of a direct expression by Congress of its intent to depart from
the usual course of trying "all suits of a civil nature" under the Rules
established for that purpose, class relief is appropriate in civil actions
brought in federal court, including those seeking to overturn determinations
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Thus, absent an express prohibition in TILA or elsewhere that
TILA's rescission cannot be sought on a class-wide basis, courts
must accept that TILA rescission is compatible with Rule 23 class
actions.
Section 1640 mentions class actions in the context of limiting
the size of damages awards in class actions." At most, this limitation
renders conspicuous § 1635's corresponding silence regarding class
actions and TILA rescission, the portion of TILA providing for the
remedy of rescission. 72 However, this silence does not create
ambiguity within the TILA-remedy context in which the discrepancy
appears or the larger context of the statute as a whole. Instead, a truly
plain reading of the statute leads to the simple presumption that the
rescission remedy is allowed in class actions without limitation
whereas damages in class actions are limited. As one commentator
notes, "The absence of a cap on rescission class actions signifies only
"173that-that there is no cap.
B. Legislative History and Congressional Intent Support
Rule 23 Compatibility with TILA Rescission
Only if courts legitimately find the text of § 1635 ambiguous
should they look for evidence beyond the statutory text to determine
congressional intent.74 In looking beyond the plain language of a
statute, courts must employ canons of statutory construction to
resolve textual ambiguities and proceed to legislative history only if
the statute remains unclear.7' Here, canons of construction and
of the departments of the Executive Branch of the Government in cases
where judicial review of such determinations is authorized.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). Had the Court intended to limit this rule to the facts
and circumstances in Yamasaki, the Court's "including those" language would have been
unnecessary. Moreover, the Court refers broadly to civil actions in federal court without
distinguishing between types of civil cases. Attempts by the Andrews and McKenna courts to
limit Yamasaki's application to TILA rescission are thus misguided efforts to preclude the
application of a general rule to a specific circumstance in which the courts wish to issue holdings
inconsistent with the rule.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 112008).
72. See id. § 1635.
73. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 16, § 6.9.9, at 487.
74. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d
401, 406 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Where the statutory language remains ambiguous [after considering the
language itself and the context in which it is used], we resort to canons of construction and, if the
meaning remains ambiguous, to legislative history." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Id.
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legislative history both further support the compatibility of the class-
action device with TILA rescission. First, the statutory-construction
principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius76 dictates that
Congress's explicit expression of a cap on class-action TILA
damages recovery excludes the possibility of a similar cap for TILA
rescission because of Congress's silence as to a class-action restraint
on this remedy. Second, the difference between the remedial natures
of damages and rescission suggests that Congress intended to limit
the remedy at law but not the remedy in equity. Third, the 1995
Amendment indicates that Congress was not concerned with the
extent of lender liability resulting from rescission actions brought for
TILA-disclosure violations beyond the increased $100 threshold
imposed post-Rodash. Finally, considerations of public policy and
separation of powers advise against judicial preclusion of rescission
class actions.
1. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
The Andrews and McKenna courts both noted that TILA's
damages provision specifically mentions a cap on class-action
recovery." Because widespread borrower exercise of rescission
rights can also be costly for lenders, these courts reasoned that
Congress made a mistake by not including a similar cap for
rescission." Other courts have found that Congress's failure to add
class-action language to § 1635 in the 1974 Amendment merely
reflects its intent to treat rescission as a purely personal remedy not
subject to class treatment. 79 However, these attempts to extract
implied and circumstantial congressional rationales for failing to cap
class-action rescission in TILA ignore the application of the well-
established statutory-construction principle expressio unius est
exclusion alterius. Rather than presuming congressional intent based
76. Black's Law Dictionary defines expressio unius est exclusio alterius as "[a] canon of
construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or the
alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
77. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2008); McKenna v. First
Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 423-24 (1st Cir. 2007).
78. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 575; McKenna, 475 F.3d at 423-24.
79. Murray v. Am.'s Mortg. Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03 C 6186, 2005 WL 1323364, at
*10-11 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005) (citing Jefferson v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63, 68
(N.D. 111. 1995)).
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on the possible consequences of the alternatives, this principle
exposes clear congressional intent in the text of the statute itself.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that judicial
inquiry into the meaning of congressional silence is a dangerous and
disfavored endeavor in statutory construction."o On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has also held that where Congress has placed a
provision in one section of a statute and remained silent in another,
this silence can be interpreted as an affirmative decision by Congress
not to apply the same provision to both parts of the statute: "Where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."" Thus, by limiting the class-action right in
one section while remaining silent in another, the correct assumption
under this rule of construction is that Congress acted deliberately in
omitting any restraint on class actions for TILA rescission when it
capped class-action TILA-damages recoveries in the 1974
Amendment.
A key factor in the expressio unius analysis is that class actions
appeared for the first time in TILA in 1974 as a cap on damages
awardable in class-action suits. The 1974 Amendment, therefore, did
not affirmatively grant class-action rights under TILA, but rather
capped a preexisting right.82 This is a strong indication that Congress
originally intended TILA to be broadly subject to the class-action
device. Moreover, Congress knew the full range of TILA remedies
available when it drafted the 1974 Amendment, but it chose to limit
only class-action damages awards. Thus, the presumption must favor
allowing rescission class actions. Had Congress meant to limit class
actions for rescission as it did with damages, it would have said so."
80. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969); Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C.,
316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) ("The search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the
pursuit of a mirage. We must be wary against interpolating our notions ofpolicy in the interstices
of legislative provisions." (emphasis added)); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1940).
81. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997).
82. See Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Though [TILA]
clearly contemplates class actions, there are no provisions within the law that create a right to
bring them . . . . The 'right' to proceed to a class action, insofar as the TILA is concerned, is a
procedural one that arises from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
83. See Andrews, 545 F.3d at 578 (Evans, J., dissenting) ("The fact that there is a cap on
damages in class actions may, in the abstract, suggest Congress sought to shield lenders from
massive liability. But we don't address the matter in the abstract. Congress wrote a statute, and if
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In the absence of such an expression, it must be understood that
Congress intended to limit only class-action damages recoveries
while not restraining class actions available for TILA rescission.
2. Damages Are a Legal Remedy
While Rescission Is an Equitable Remedy
That TILA limits lender liability for damages in the class-action
context yet allows for unrestrained rescission class actions does not
create an inconsistency in the statutory scheme. Instead it illustrates a
fundamental difference between damages and rescission as remedies.
Damages are a legal while rescission is an equitable remedy.84 Given
this distinction, it makes sense that Congress would choose to leave
the court's equitable powers unrestrained. Because damages are
meant only to compensate an injured party,85 a statutory-damages cap
is an appropriate measure to ensure that a class-action damages
award does not become unduly punitive. In an equitable context,
however, the court should be given more latitude to consider the
broader equities at stake. This could include allowing class-wide
rescission to return borrowers to their status quo ante, even if that
rescission would have a punitive effect on lenders. Thus, the
equitable nature of rescission as a remedy further supports a finding
that failure to restrain TILA-rescission classes was neither a mistake
nor an indication that rescission class actions should be precluded
entirely.
3. 1995 Amendment
The 1995 Amendment does not support the idea that Congress
intended to exempt TILA rescission from class-action amenability.
As previously mentioned, the McKenna and Andrews courts both
reasoned that the presence of a class-action damages cap from the
1970s is inconsistent with allowing unrestrained class-wide TILA
rescission because of the potential costs lenders could incur as a
result.86 This reasoning ignores that Congress knew of more than
it sought to further such a policy in the rescission context, we should assume it would have said
so.").
84. See, e.g., 13 AM. JUR. 2D Cancellation of Instruments § 2 (2010); 25 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 67:8 (4th ed. 2009).
85. See 25 WILLISTON, supra note 84, § 67:8.
86. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 575; McKenna v. First Horizon Bank, 475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir.
2007) ("It is nose-on-the-face plain that unrestricted class action availability for rescission claims
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fifty pending class-action TILA-rescission cases when it amended
TILA in 1995.8" At that time, Congress could have broadened its
limitations on class actions from the existing damages cap to a
broader ban on class actions or a ban on class-wide rescission.
Congress chose instead to raise the tolerance level for TILA
violations. It is inappropriate to infer more from congressional
history than Congress's actions actually demonstrate. Had Congress
wanted to ban class-action rescission, it could have done so
explicitly.
4. Public Policy Considerations
Circuit Judge Terence Evans's dissent in Andrews raises several
policy considerations regarding attempts to read congressional intent
into an arguably unambiguous statute. Judge Evans asks, "If the
statute is unclear . . . [w]ho should pay the price of Congress's
sloppy drafting?" 8 Rather than penalizing those who violated the
law, the First and Seventh Circuits have instead placed the burden of
arguably sloppy drafting on the victims of TILA violations.89 This
result is especially unfair in view of TILA's express consumer-
protection mandate.90 In concluding that "it is better to acknowledge
ambiguity and construe the statute in the way most supported by the
statute's language and in a fashion that protects the innocent, not the
guilty,"" Judge Evans recognizes that court preclusion of class-wide
TILA rescission not only ignores the statutory interpretation most in
would open the door for vast recoveries. . . . The notion that Congress would limit liability to
$500,000 with respect to one remedy while allowing the sky to be the limit with respect to
another remedy for the same violation strains credulity.").
87. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 16, § 6.9.9, at 486 ("In McKenna v. First Horizon
Loan Corp., the First Circuit held that a rescission class action-even one that sought only a
declaratory judgment-could not be maintained. Its main rationale was that a rescission class
action could be costly to the creditor, and that this would be contrary to the Rodash amendments
adopted in 1995. But in fact the Rodash amendments compel the opposite conclusion: since
Congress was faced with industry complaints regarding rescission class actions and chose not to
ban them, but only to limit the grounds for rescission, it should be even clearer that rescission
class actions are allowed.").
88. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 579 (Evans, J., dissenting).
89. See id.
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. Andrews, 545 F.3d at 579 (Evans, J., dissenting); Jo Carillo & Paul Kofoed, The Sound
of Silence: The Continuing Legal Debate over Class Action Rescission Under TILA, 6 HASTINGS
Bus. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2010).
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tune with TILA's language but also weakens TILA's underlying
purpose.
Judicial attempts to construe a statute perceived as ambiguous
also raise important separation-of-powers considerations. Prior to the
Seventh Circuit's decision, the Andrews family's attorney expressed
concern that lenders were attempting to scare the judiciary into
rewriting TILA to exclude class actions for TILA rescission because
they were unable to convince Congress to do so in the 1990s. 9 2
However, the Constitution vests only Congress with the power to
draft statutes.93 Therefore, had Congress in fact intended to preclude
rescission class actions, it is Congress's duty, not the courts', to
amend the statute and correct its error. 94 Any attempt by the courts to
read absent language into TILA's text would effectively expand the
powers of the judiciary at the expense of the legislative branch's.
Moreover, when courts attempt to rewrite ambiguous statutes, sloppy
drafting is encouraged.95 "And if the court gets it wrong-a hazard of
judicial guesswork-then all suffer."96
By misconstruing the addition of class-action language to TILA
in the 1974 Amendment, courts have failed to appropriately apply
well-established and self-imposed statutory-construction principles.
Moreover, because rescission is an equitable remedy, it makes sense
to allow rescission without constraint. Nevertheless, courts have
confused congressional concern for significant lender liability (in the
face of technical TILA violations reflected in the 1995 Amendments)
with congressional intent that lenders be shielded from severe
liability for any TILA violation. The congressional record does not
support this interpretation. Instead, public policy and the separation
of powers doctrine dictate that Congress, not the courts, should be
charged with correcting any perceived problems with TILA as
currently written.
92. Gina Keating, Mortgage Rescission Could Be Class Action Nightmare for U.S. Banks,
INS. J., Jul. 7, 2008, available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2008/07/07/
91590.htm ("If (banks) get relief (from the appeals court), it's activist judges trying to give
[banks] what they could not get legislatively.").
93. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . .
94. See id
95. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 579 (7th Cir. 2008).
96. Id.
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III. COURT PROTECTION AGAINST
"CRUSHING LENDER LIABILITY" IS INAPPROPRIATE AND
PERPETUATES DANGEROUS LENDING PRACTICES
Lenders whose repeated TILA violations create sufficiently
numerous borrower victims to warrant class treatment should be held
accountable for their actions, not protected out of concern for their
financial stability. Nevertheless, courts have transformed TILA's
allowance for the consideration of lender resources for class-action
damages awards into a broad "crushing liability"97 defense. Even if
such an interpretation were warranted, prudential limitations exist to
constrain its blanket use. Moreover, the true effect on lender balance
sheets of certified declaration-of-rescindability classes is unknown,
but likely not terribly threatening. Even if lenders did face significant
liability, it would likely advance TILA's consumer-protection
purpose by more accurately exposing the true cost of credit.
However, by coddling lender concerns over potential liability, courts
have perpetuated illegal activities, thereby abdicating their
responsibility to enforce laws and protect the public.
A. "Crushing Liability" Is Not an Acceptable Defense to
Material TILA Disclosure Violations
While TILA does allow courts to consider creditors' financial
resources in determining the amount of a class-action damages
award,98 "crushing liability" is still not a defense to TILA-violation
lawsuits.99 To the extent that a court may consider a lender's
financial status in certifying TILA-rescission classes, the court
should limit such a defense to those lenders for whom insolvency is a
real possibility. Courts should not use the defense as a vehicle to
preclude the class-action device altogether.
"Crushing liability" is not a per se defense to TILA violations,
regardless of the remedy sought. In assessing damages, TILA directs
the courts to consider "the frequency and persistence of failures of
compliance by the creditor" and "the extent to which the creditor's
97. McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 426 (1st Cir. 2007).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006).
99. Cf Jo Carrillo, This Little Loan Went to Market: The Consumer-Lender-Investor
Equation of Federal Truth in Lending, 28 No. 8 BANKING & FIN. SERV.'S POL'Y REP. 7, 11
(2009) ("Only Congress should have the power to shield lenders from liability under TILA, since
only Congress has the full information of how best to balance the three-part consumer-lender-
investor equation that animates TILA.").
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failure of compliance was intentional."'oo Section 1640 also expressly
allows the court to consider a lender's resources in determining the
amount of a damages award in any class action.'"' That courts can
consider lender resources does not give them discretion to award
damages that fail to reflect the extent of harm caused by the lender.
These are different things. Consideration of lender resources gives
courts discretion to determine the amount of a damages award that
will best deter the lender from committing future violations.10 2
Sometimes lender resources can weigh in favor of lowering damages.
However, the same consideration may also increase a damages
award. The language of the statute is neutral. If the defendant is
financially strong and a small award of damages would not deter
further wrongdoing, then the language of the statute could justify a
higher award. Even if some members of Congress did not intend this
result when adding this language to the statute, such a result is
possible within the statute's plain language.
Moreover, to the extent that courts take issue with TILA's plain
language, it must be re-emphasized that only Congress is empowered
to rewrite TILA. In response to arguments "that the cost of defending
consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small
businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers,"
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[t]hese are not
unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more
properly addressed to Congress than to" the courts.0 3 Thus, the
creation of a new "crushing liability" defense to class-action TILA
rescission is the sole province of Congress, not the judiciary.
Courts' concerns over imposing potentially catastrophic liability
are particularly unfounded because putative class members seek only
declarations of rescindability, which do not create new rights for
those members but merely notify them of pre-existing rights under
federal law. Because TILA imposes strict liability on lenders for
each violation, it would be illogical to allow each plaintiff to sue for
rescissory relief individually while prohibiting them from doing so as
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).
101. Section 1635 contains no comparable language. See id. § 1635. Following the expressio
unius rationale discussed supra at Part II, this omission would indicate that lender resources are
not available for consideration at all in the TILA-rescission context.
102. Id. § 1640(a).
103. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979).
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a class. The only real difference would be that class actions may
inform more injured borrowers that their rights were violated.
Ultimately, denying TILA-rescission class actions allows lenders to
violate TILA while limiting rescission to sophisticated borrowers
who sue individually. Meanwhile, the unsophisticated masses-
unaware that their rights have been violated-suffer the effects of an
unaffordable loan.
Where lenders have actually violated the law, risk of insolvency
should not preclude plaintiffs from recovering for strict-liability
violations, regardless of whether suit is brought individually or as a
class.'" The Supreme Court has found that the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil damages awards
between private parties, but only to criminal process and cases
brought by the government to inflict punishment. o' Just as "a
[criminal] defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from
punishment,"' so too a civil defendant should be held accountable
for actions in violation of the law. Businesses that violate the law
over the course of many transactions are often rendered insolvent by
the ensuing litigation, but well they should be.'" A business
dependent on violating the law to make a profit should not be
allowed to continue to operate.
Furthermore, the benefits that businesses confer on society and
the economy must be balanced against the harm that those businesses
do to those who depend on their services. Some have suggested that
"in return for granting businesses their franchise to operate, society
104. See Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974)
("[W]hile procedural fairness with respect to protecting defendants from crushing damages
predicated on the statutory minimum recovery is an important consideration in determining the
superiority of the class-action mode of adjudication, it is at least equally important to prevent
violators of the Act from limiting recovery to a few individuals where actual, wide-spread
noncompliance is found to exist.").
105. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60
(1989).
106. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 (1983).
107. See, e.g., Bruce V. Bigelow, S.D. Diocese Follows Lead of Others in Bankruptcy, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 18, 2007, at Fl (discussing notable bankruptcy filings made by
companies threatened with mass-tort litigation); cf MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 237 (9th ed. 2005) ("As a practical matter, piercing [the
corporate veil] is normally important only where the corporation lacks sufficient assets to pay the
creditor's claims. That is not a frequent occurrence in the case of publicly held corporations-
although it does happen, and in a handful of cases, tort claims themselves have resulted in the
bankruptcy of such corporations.").
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has expectations of what businesses will provide and how they will
behave."'" TILA embodies the expectation that businesses will offer
transparent consumer information and will protect consumers. 0o
Under this theory, a lender's social and economic legitimacy
deteriorates once the lender begins systematically violating TILA. In
this context, harsh sanctions-including insolvency-are justified in
order to renew that legitimacy and diminish the costs that the lender
imposes on society.
Finally, even if "crushing liability" were a defense to TILA-
disclosure violations, it should not categorically preclude TILA-
rescission classes. While large rescission classes could result in
substantial lender liability,"0 especially for small lenders, not every
class would be a large one."' Most lenders are large enough that, for
example, a lender facing a fifty-person class action because it
violated TILA fifty times could not reasonably argue that class-wide
rescission would put it out of business. In fact, in neither McKenna
nor Andrews was there a strong empirical basis for the courts'
concern about "crushing liability": a liberal estimate of the cost of
rescission in McKenna is $200 million"2 for a lender with $26 billion
in assets,"' and the cost of rescission in Andrews would have been
around $210 million" 4 for a lender with $15 billion in assets."'
108. William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the Need to Redesign
Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote Ethical Behavior and Discourage
Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 56 (2004).
109. Id. at 57.
110. For example, the McKenna court noted that First Horizon Bank's exposure in that case
would be approximately $200 million if the court allowed the class to proceed. McKenna v. First
Horizon Bank, 475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2007). The court further noted that "[t]he
$200,000,000 estimate appear[ed] to be based on a recovery of approximately $22,000 for each of
the estimated 8,900 members of the putative class." Id. at 424 n.2.
Ill. While the McKenna class had an estimated 8,900 putative class members, the class in
Tower v. Moss, for example, only contained 143 class members. Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161,
1163 (5th Cir. 1980). While 143 members could still be considered a relatively large class, a
comparison with the McKenna class illustrates the vast disparity in potential class sizes.
112. See supra note I10.
113. E.g., First Horizon Closes 2009 with Asset Quality Improvements, Repositions for
Strength, GLOBAL NEWSWIRE, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.globenewswire.com/newsroom/
news.html?d=182073.
114. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees Susan and Bryan Andrews and the Class at 39 n.13,
Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1326).
115. E.g., CHEVY CHASE BANK, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2007), available at https:/www.
chevychasebank.com/pdf/2007_annual; Bryant Ruiz Switzky, Chevy Chase Bank Sale Leaves
Trust Unit Alone, WASH. BUS. J., Apr. 10-16, 2009, available at http://www.chevychase
trust.com/pdfs/28158%2OChevy%20Chase%20Trust.pdf.
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Where a lender would not be rendered insolvent or otherwise
severely financially handicapped by a rescission class, the lender
should not be permitted to use a "crushing liability" defense, and the
class action should be permitted to proceed. Even if courts could
consider the risk of lender insolvency in certifying TILA-rescission
classes, such a consideration should be limited to those lenders for
whom crushing liability is a real possibility. The potential for
crushing liability in some hypothetical cases does not justify barring
TILA-rescission class actions completely.
B. Class Certification for TILA Rescission Is
Unlikely to Cause Crushing Liability and
Will Ensure Safer Lending Practices
There is no evidence that lenders with legitimate concerns about
insolvency and only small-scale TILA violations would face
"crushing liability" if subjected to a class-wide declaration of
rescission rights. A lender would face insolvency only if violations
are so routine that the lender's entire portfolio consists of loans sold
without proper disclosures. Furthermore, the small added cost of
complying with TILA regulations should justify strict liability,
regardless of its financial impact, to create a more transparent
lending industry, even if such strict liability means putting more
lenders out of business and increasing the cost of home-refinance
loans and second mortgages.
There is also insufficient evidence to suggest that every-or
even most--class members would actually seek rescission if courts
certified classes for a declaration of rescindability. Existing evidence
actually indicates the contrary. For example, in Tower v. Moss,'16 the
Fifth Circuit allowed class-action rescission as part of a settlement
agreement. The agreement entitled class members to elect between
rescinding their loans or recovering damages in the form of a 15
percent reduction in their loan principal."' Out of 143 class
members, only 40 chose rescission."' Furthermore, in the present
economic climate, the drop in home values makes it less likely that a
116. 625 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. Id. at 1163.
118. Id. at 1163-64.
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borrower would seek rescission as a remedy."' It would therefore
appear that estimates of lender liability based on projected losses in
the event that every class member elects to rescind are drastically
overstated.
Some members of the lending industry insist that the threat of
enormous liability posed by class-action rescission would make
credit more costly and difficult to obtain.'20 However, the expense of
complying with TILA is not large, and borrowers benefit from being
told the actual terms of loans rather than receiving misleading TILA
disclosures. Additionally, imposing strict liability could itself benefit
borrowers by exposing the potential dangers and accurate costs of
obtaining home-refinance loans. As an analogy, the automotive
industry does not forego crash safety precautions for cheaper cars
because manufacturers face potentially devastating liability if their
cars do not meet crash safety standards. Although the next potential
buyer suffers the price of a subsequent lawsuit to some extent, the
resulting increase in the product's price will reflect the danger in the
product.'2 ' The same is true for the lending industry: should a lender
go out of business and cause the cost of lending to increase, that
increase will simply reflect the potential danger in borrowing that the
lender failed to accurately disclose. If the lender stays in business,
borrowers will go to another lender offering lower prices because
that lender never violated the law in the first place. As a result,
lenders are held more accountable for their lending practices; also,
119. To illustrate, imagine a borrower obtained a $300,000 mortgage backed by the value of
her home. After a year of making payments, the borrower's home has dropped in value to
$200,000. Now imagine this borrower receives a notice of her right to rescind her mortgage as a
member of a class of certified borrowers. The borrower may have the right to rescind but will
likely choose not to because she will be unable to return the principal as required by the TILA
rescission process. Because the borrower will only be able to obtain another mortgage at a value
of $200,000, she will be $100,000 shy of completing her end of the rescission process.
120. E.g., Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 11-12, Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 129
S. Ct. 2864 (2009) (No. 08-1206) ("The threat of such devastating liability from just one
rescission class action would inevitably make credit more costly and difficult to obtain, an
outcome squarely at odds with Congress's efforts to protect both borrowers and the credit
industry, as reflected in TILA's text and history.").
121. This justification for strict products liability is often referred to as "enterprise liability"
or "risk-spreading" in tort law. By manufacturing a product, manufacturers are thought to assume
a special responsibility to the general public who may be injured by the product. Because the
public is often forced to rely on the seller for certain goods, and the seller is often in a better
position to prevent injuries caused by its products, public policy dictates that sellers should bear
the risk of liability as a cost of doing business for which liability insurance can be obtained. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1977).
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loans that appear cheaper on their faces because of misleading terms
are more likely to be eliminated, thereby more accurately
representing the true cost of borrowing. While there may be some
short-term costs of lender insolvency, such costs will be outweighed
by the long-term benefits of greater honesty and loan-term
transparency.
IV. BORROWERS HAVE STANDING AS A CLASS TO
SEEK REDRESS FOR INADEQUATE TILA DISCLOSURES
An examination of the Andrews and McKenna rationales for
disallowing class certification in suits seeking declarations of
rescindability reveals that these courts erred in precluding TILA-
rescission class actions by misinterpreting TILA's statutory
language, TILA's legislative history, and the underlying equities.
What remains to be determined is whether procedural standing and
Rule 23 class-certification requirements stand in the way of allowing
class-wide declarations of rescindability. This part concludes that
standing and class certification should be easily surmountable
obstacles for class-wide declarations of rescindability. Courts
suggesting that borrowers lack standing to seek a class-wide
declaration of rescindability overlook the fact that TILA provides
these borrowers with a right to contract with full disclosure. Lenders
that give borrowers inadequate or misleading TILA disclosures
violate this right, thereby creating a justiciable. controversy.
Furthermore, borrowers seeking class certification to redress their
subsequent injuries have framed the relief they seek consistent with
Rule 23's class-certification requirements. Class-wide declaration-of-
rescindability actions should not merely be permitted to proceed;
rather, such actions are ideal candidates for class certification.
A. Inadequate TILA Disclosures Create an Injury in Fact
Redressable by a Declaration ofRescindability
TILA provides that a party seeking rescission must notify the
lender of her intent to rescind.'2 2 Upon receipt of such notice, the
lender has twenty days to respond.'2 3 Pursuant to this framework,
some courts reason that TILA requires borrowers to assert rescission
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
123. Id
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rights "on an individual basis and within individual time frames,
before filing suit."1 24 Therefore, these courts hold that no actual
controversy exists between the parties where borrowers file suit as a
class before individually completing TILA's statutorily required
steps. 125
In contrast, other courts hold that the filing of a complaint itself
serves as the requisite notice of the borrowers' exercise of the right
to rescind.126 According to these courts, all putative class members
are deemed to have given written notice of rescission once the
complaint has been filed. Consequently, each class member has a
live controversy for which the remedy sought-a declaration of each
class member's right to rescind-would redress the controversy.
The problem with the latter construction, however, is that it
conflates the declaration of rescindability with rescission en masse
by allowing the complaint to effectively tender rescission notices.
The borrower's notice to the lender of his or her exercise of the right
to rescind sets the rescission process in motion. As one court noted:
[C]onstru[ing] the mere filing of a class action complaint as
a statutory notice of rescission . . . would trigger the
lender's obligation to terminate its security interest in all of
the class members' property, and could trigger the class
members' obligation to tender the money or property
received back to the lender. 127
Interpreting the filing of the complaint as notice to constitute
standing also obscures the fact that these classes are only seeking a
declaration of the right to rescind, not rescission itself.
124. Gibbons v. Interbank Funding Grp., 208 F.R.D. 278, 285 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Jefferson v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63, 69 (N.D. Ill.
1995)).
125. Id. ("It is undisputed that the purported class members ... have not submitted notices to
rescind. Thus, plaintiff is effectively asking for an advisory opinion. Without any rescission
requests, nor subsequent denials by defendants, it is not at all clear that a justiciable controversy
exists between the class and defendants."); see also Jefferson, 161 F.R.D. at 69.
126. Taylor v. Domestic Remodeling, 97 F.3d 96, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1996); McKenna v. First
Horizon Home Loan Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 291, 304 (D. Mass. 2006), rev'd, 475 F.3d 418 (1st
Cir. 2007); McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust, Co., 215 F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Mass. 2003);
Eveland v. Star Bank, NA, 976 F. Supp. 721, 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 764 F.
Supp. 102, 105-06 (N.D. 111. 1991); Hunter v. Richmond Equity, No. CV 85-P-2734-S, 1987 WL
109703, *4 (N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Rodrigues, 278 B.R. 683, 689 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2002) ("Filing a
complaint against the Mortgagor serves as proper notice of recission [sic] of a TILA/HOEPA
mortgage, if timely filed, and if it specifically addresses rescission [sic].").
127. LaLiberte v. Pac. Mercantile Bank, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 751 (2007).
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Other authority presents a simpler and more workable standing
theory. At the outset, it should be noted that while TILA's statutory-
notice requirement may be a statutory "precondition to filing a
claim[, it] does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter
jurisdiction." 28 Further, in initially certifying the requested class, the
trial court in McKenna pointed out that "[t]he Supreme Court has
long recognized that '[t]he actual or threatened injury required by
Art[icle] III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing . . . ."'129 The Fourth
Circuit applied this reasoning specifically to TILA when it stated:
It is essential to note that Congress in creating this statutory
scheme did not impose simply a general duty of "adequate
disclosure" upon creditors and provide for suit only by
debtors able to show that they were "aggrieved" by the
creditor's inadequate performance. Rather, Congress gave
the debtor a right to specific information and therefore
defined "injury in fact" as the failure to disclose such
information.'3 0
The proposed classes at issue consist only of those borrowers
who received disclosures with the same error. Each of these class
members had a right to contract with full disclosure. The lenders'
failure to provide adequate disclosures violated this right, thereby
constituting an injury-in-fact that establishes legal standing.
Therefore, under this argument, each class is necessarily confined to
those borrowers who already have standing. As such, the declaration
of rescindability that each class member may choose to act upon will
redress the specific injury being addressed-the underlying
disclosure error.
128. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010).
129. McKenna, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 373 (1982)).
130. White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1975).
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B. TILA Declaration ofRescindability Claims Are
Appropriate for Class Certification Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Where the elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are
met,' 3' Rule 23(b) outlines three methods by which a class action
may be certified. Of those three, only two have been sought in the
TILA-rescission context: 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).13 2 Plaintiffs seeking
a class-wide declaration of rescindability can satisfy the elements of
both 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) classes. Although courts may be justified
in refusing to certify 23(b)(2) classes in certain circumstances
depending on the nature of the TILA violation, it is appropriate for
courts to certify 23(b)(3) classes for any putative class seeking a
declaration of rescindability.
1. Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) certification requires that the party opposing
certification act or refuse to act on grounds applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate to the class as a whole final injunctive or
"corresponding declaratory relief." 33 To be directed at a class, action
or inaction need only generally apply to the class; it is sufficient that
one or a few members of the class have been affected or
threatened.'34 In the context of TILA rescission, therefore, a lender's
policy of tendering inadequate TILA disclosures to borrowers need
not have adversely affected all members of the class; the policy need
not even be opposed by all members of the class. Rather, the legally
inadequate TILA disclosures at issue need only to have been
131. Rule 23(a) sets forth the four prerequisites for class certification, commonly referred to
as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
While these elements are often disputed in TLA-rescission cases, the bulk of court analysis turns
primarily on the specific requirements of the type of class sought rather than on the 23(a)
requirements. Therefore, this Article is limited to the distinction between relevant 23(b) classes.
132. Rule 23(b)(1) classes have likely not been sought in this context because borrowers
bringing individual rescission claims would not create a substantial risk of inconsistent
adjudications creating incompatible standards of conduct for lenders or impeding the interests of
other borrowers with identical disclosure errors. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1). Because TILA
disclosure regulations are objectively framed, a determination that a disclosure does or does not
contain a TILA infirmity should not create incompatible standards of conduct. Furthermore,
individual rescission actions do not depend upon the success or failure of similar actions brought
by other borrowers.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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tendered to the putative class members for the first element to be
met.
A 23(b)(2) class requires cohesiveness among its members. This
means that all class members must have a uniform interest in the suit
and that none of the named class members' situations present a
legally relevant factual difference from other class members.1
Cohesiveness is necessary largely because 23(b)(2) classes, unlike
23(b)(3) classes, do not compel mandatory notice to all individual
class members that the action is pending'36 and do not give class
members the opportunity to opt out.'37 Instead, the court is given
discretion to direct appropriate notice to the class,"' and all class
members are bound by the final judgment. The absence of notice and
opt-out requirements in 23(b)(2) classes presents a significant cost
advantage for borrowers in difficult financial situations. The time
involved in locating every potential class member and the cost of
effecting proper notice could deter many plaintiffs from bringing
TILA-rescission claims on a class-wide basis. This is especially true
for larger classes where notice could be "so expensive and time-
consuming as to render valid claims unworthy of pursuit," even for
plaintiffs of decent means.'39 However, the trade-off for this cost
advantage is that class members must be sufficiently cohesive such
that unnamed class members (without notice) bound to the class
share a common-enough interest in the suit that a determination in
their absence would not jeopardize their legal interests.'4 0
Cohesiveness also ensures that individual issues do not overwhelm
the action and make it unmanageable."
135. STUART T. ROSSMAN & CHARLES DELBAUM, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS § 9.4.2, at
125 (6th ed. 2006).
136. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (allowing the court to direct appropriate notice to
the class) with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring "the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through a
reasonable effort").
137. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (providing that notice to 23(b)(3) class members
must include a statement that the court will exclude any member who requests exclusion) with
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (containing no comparable provision).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
139. ROSSMAN & DELBAUM, supra note 135, § 9.4.1, at 125.
140. Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (quoting
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco, 161 F.3d 127, 142-44 (3d Cir. 1998).
141. Id. (quoting Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143).
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In the TILA class-action rescission context, cohesiveness exists
because the classes each have the same primary issue: whether the
documents tendered to borrowers at closing violated TILA.
Consequently, the certifying judge need only narrow the class to
those borrowers who received the same standard loan forms
containing the alleged infirmity. Since Regulation Z requires lenders
to keep records of compliance for at least two years,14 2 this
determination is relatively simple. Because the discovery of a TILA
violation is an objective inquiry and the class can be narrowed to
those receiving the disclosure at issue, no individual issues will be
presented at the class-certification stage.
With respect to the express requirements of 23(b)(2)
certification, the purpose of the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought must be to "settl[e] the legality of the behavior with respect to
the class as a whole."' 4 3 The borrowers seek a declaration that the
lender's behavior was illegal and that such behavior entitles each
class member to relief. Thus, the necessary purpose of the requested
declaratory relief in 23(b)(2) actions is also met in TILA declaration-
of-rescindability cases.
A significant difficulty with 23(b)(2) classes in the TILA-
rescission context, however, is determining whether the declaration
of rescindability plaintiff-borrowers seek is appropriate for 23(b)(2)
certification. The Advisory Committee Notes state that "[d]eclaratory
relief 'corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it
affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive
relief"'" Thus, declaratory relief is only appropriate for 23(b)(2)
classes in those limited circumstances where it has the effect of
granting or laying the foundation for injunctive relief.'45 The
rationale for Rule 23(b)(2)'s focus on the injunctive nature of the
relief sought is that cohesiveness deteriorates when the class seeks
142. 12 C.F.R. § 226.25.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
144. Id.
145. The trial-level Andrews court appears to have overlooked this distinction when it found
that a "declaratory judgment would settle the issue of whether defendant violated TILA and, if so,
whether such violation gives rise to the right to rescind." Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB,
240 F.R.D. 612, 623-24 (E.D. Wis. 2007), rev'd, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008). While this
analysis appropriately determines the legality of the lender's behavior with respect to the class as
a whole, the court failed to address how the declaratory relief sought corresponded to injunctive
relief.
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damages requiring individual determinations based on individual
injuries.146 It also protects the interests of those plaintiffs who may
want to pursue monetary claims individually rather than being bound
to a class-wide rescission judgment on the issue. 147
Many courts, including the Supreme Court,148 have stated that
plaintiffs may seek either injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule
23(b)(2). Because declaratory relief must correspond to injunctive
relief, however, the type of declaratory relief available under the rule
depends largely on the effect of the judicial directive.149 Therefore, a
declaration that a lender's practice of tendering inadequate
disclosures violates TILA would have the effect of enjoining the
lender from tendering those disclosures."' On the other hand, if the
declaration sought by the class of plaintiffs would simply lay the
basis for a future damages award instead of injunctive relief, then
23(b)(2) certification would likely be inappropriate.'
One strong argument against class certification for a declaration
of rescindability under Rule 23(b)(2) is that the declaration sought
appears to create a basis for future monetary relief and is thus
improper for 23(b)(2) purposes. However, the declaration could also
serve as the basis for an injunction against future use of the
inadequate disclosures.' Before a court may grant a declaration of
rescindability to a class of borrowers, it must find that the lender's
146. 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLtN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5:15, at 5-58 (3d ed. 2006) ("Actions for class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief are intended
for (b)(2) certification precisely because they involve uniform group remedies. Such relief may
often be awarded without requiring a specific or time-consuming inquiry into the varying
circumstances and merits of each class member's individual case.") (quoting McManus v.
Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 553 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Young v. Meyer & Njus,
P.A., 183 F.R.D 231, 235 (N.D. IIl. 1998) (certifying a 23(b)(2) class for declaratory relief as well
as monetary damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act where the damages flowed
directly from the declaratory judgment and were readily calculable on a class-wide basis).
147. MCLAUGHLN, supra note 146, § 5:15 at 5-57 (citing United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d
511, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)).
148. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ("Rule 23(b)(2) permits
class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where 'the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.').
149. ROSSMAN & DELBAUM, supra note 135, § 9.4.2.4, at 127 (citing 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER
& KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 (3d ed. 2005)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. E.g., id. ("If the requested relief is a declaration . .. that a business practice is unfair or
deceptive, the resulting judicial declaratory directive would have the effect of 'enjoining' . . . the
commitment of the offending practice.").
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practices violate TILA. Such a declaration would thus establish that
the lender's disclosures are illegal, which would serve as the basis
for future injunctive relief should the lender continue to use the
offending disclosures.' Although plaintiffs frame the declaration
they seek in terms of the remedy that would become available,
declaration of rescindability would nevertheless satisfy the 23(b)(2)
requirement that any declaratory relief sought afford injunctive
relief.
Assuming that plaintiffs can establish that a declaration of
rescindability corresponds to injunctive relief, plaintiffs seeking
23(b)(2) certification still face difficulties when damages are also
available. The Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 23(b)(2)
classes "do[] not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief
relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages."' 54 Courts
have generally denied class certification in cases seeking only
declaratory relief for claims in which the plaintiff could normally ask
for money damages.'" Courts have rejected these sorts of claims
"because it appears that the plaintiff is really attempting to lay the
foundation for a later damages action while avoiding the additional
requirements of notice and opt-out, which are attendant to a
[23](b)(3) class action."' As explained in Part V.B.3, infra, this is a
policy consideration applicable only to cases in which the borrowers
seek a declaration of rescindability for a disclosure error unrelated to
153. The declaratory relief sought need not actually afford injunctive relief. Recall that the
rationale for Rule 23(b)(2)'s injunctive relief requirement is to prevent situations where plaintiffs
seek to certify a 23(b)(2) class in order to avoid the added costs of 23(b)(3) certification but doing
so would require individualized assessments that would destroy cohesiveness among class
members. See supra notes 136-41, 145-47 and accompanying text. In light of this purpose, the
fact that a declaratory judgment against a defunct lender necessarily could not result in actual
injunctive relief, for example, should not prevent the class from proceeding where the effect of
the declaratory relief would not undermine the cohesiveness of the class. For a discussion of
situations where a declaration of rescindability in the TILA context would have such an effect,
see Part V.B.3, infra.
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998), is the leading authority on determining
whether a class seeks predominantly equitable or monetary relief. The court held that monetary
relief may not be sought in a 23(b)(2) class action "unless it is incidental to requested injunctive
or declaratory relief." Id. at 415. The court narrowly construed "incidental" to include only
damages flowing "directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of
the injunctive or declaratory relief." Id.
155. Andrew Bradt, "Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose": Implications of the History of the
Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 805 (2006).
156. Id.
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the disclosure of the right to rescind (because damages are an
available remedy for failure to disclose the right to rescind). The
simple response to this difficulty is that plaintiff classes seeking a
declaration of rescindability for disclosure errors unrelated to the
right to rescind should be precluded from 23(b)(2) certification. 5
This is because damages awardable to plaintiffs redressing injuries
emanating from TILA-disclosure violations do not flow directly from
the declaratory relief sought.'
2. Rule 23(b)(3)
While 23(b)(2) classes should be certifiable for a declaration of
rescindability, certain circumstances and potential interpretive
problems may make 23(b)(3) classes a more appropriate vehicle for
class certification in the TILA-rescission context. Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions require that "questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any question affecting only individual
members" and that a class action be "superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."159
These requirements are commonly referred to as predominance and
superiority, respectively.
Certification of 23(b)(3) classes for a declaration of
rescindability typically turns on the predominance requirement.1"'
TILA violations are objectively determined based on the
representations contained in the relevant disclosure.' 1 Therefore, the
issue is not whether each individual plaintiff understood his or her
loan document, but whether the standardized loan document
provided to all class members contained the same facially apparent
TILA infirmity.
157. For further discussion on this point, see Part V.B.3, infra.
158. See supra note 146.
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
160. See Jefferson v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63, 68 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (denying
certification of a 23(b)(3) class for failure to meet 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement because
TILA rescission is a personal remedy requiring a creditor to act on a consumer's notice of
rescission before a claim can be filed in court); Rodrigues v. Members Mortg. Co., Inc., 226
F.R.D. 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2005) (certifying a 23(b)(3) class but noting that the real class-
certification dispute concerned predominance).
161. E.g., Zamarippa v. Cy's Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982) ("An
objective standard is used to determine violations of the TILA, based on the representations
contained in the relevant disclosure documents; it is unnecessary to inquire as to the subjective
deception or misunderstanding of particular consumers.").
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Efficiency is the primary focus in determining whether a
proposed 23(b)(3) class meets the superiority requirement. The court
must determine the best available method for resolving the
controversy consistent with principles of judicial integrity,
convenience, and economy. The Seventh Circuit Andrews court
maintained that declarations of rescindability would undermine
judicial economy because they necessarily open the door to
individual remedy-stage proceedings for consumers seeking to
rescind.162 This, however, overlooks the benefits of efficiency that a
declaration of rescindability would actually provide.
The determination of whether a disclosure contains a TILA
violation can be fact intensive. If every borrower who received the
same erroneous loan document had to bring suit individually, courts
would have to repeatedly review that document each time the lender
contested the alleged violation. This would create a substantial risk
of inconsistent judgments, would be far less efficient than a single
suit designed to determine whether a lender had violated TILA, and
would likely encourage the parties to resolve the dispute efficiently
via settlement.
3. Appropriateness of 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3) Class Certification
As shown, plaintiffs seeking a class-wide declaration of
rescindability generally satisfy the required elements for both
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class certification. However, the specific
nature of the TILA violation at issue may render one of these class-
certification standards more appropriate than the other.
Recall that TILA rescission may be granted either where a
lender fails to provide a borrower with clear notice of the three-day
162. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[A] host of
individual proceedings would almost certainly follow in the wake of the certification of a class
whose loan transactions are referable to rescission. . . . In short, the rescission remedy prescribed
by TILA is procedurally and substantively incompatible with the class-action device."); see also
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 427 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A]bsent class
members would have the same right to seek rescission after a declaratory judgment was rendered
as they had previously. Thus, should the need arise for an absent class member to resort to the
courts for enforcement of his or her right to rescind, the declaratory judgment would serve that
end no more effectively than would a non-class-action suit brought by named plaintiffs alleging
identical TILA violations. So viewed, a class declaratory judgment would work against judicial
economy and disserve efficiency concerns."). Andrews did not address the Rule 23(b)(3)
superiority context, but the court's argument regarding declarations of rescindability implicates
the same policy concerns.
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right to rescind or where a lender tenders an inaccurate disclosure
(beyond tolerances) of material loan terms.' TILA's rescission
provision only allows damages as an additional remedy in a TILA-
rescission action where the lender has made a faulty disclosure
unrelated to the borrower's right to rescind." Therefore, borrowers
could seek 23(b)(2) certification as a means of foregoing the added
costs of 23(b)(3) certification in these cases. Accordingly, courts are
likely justified in refusing to certify a 23(b)(2) class for plaintiffs
seeking a class-wide declaration of rescindability for TILA-
disclosure infirmities related to the underlying terms of the
borrowers' loans.' In situations where 23(b)(2) class certification is
inappropriate, however, 23(b)(3) class certification would
nevertheless be available. Moreover, because the 23(b)(3) elements
are met, courts would not be justified in refusing 23(b)(3)
certification under any circumstances, regardless of the nature of the
TILA violation.
Another viable class-certification mechanism available to courts
is hybrid certification. Hybrid certification is a recognized and
innovative solution for plaintiffs seeking 23(b)(2) certification where
damages are also available. Hybrid certification means that a court
certifies a class for equitable relief as a 23(b)(2) class, and the class
later seeks separate certification under 23(b)(3) for damages.166 This
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(g) (2006) ("In any action in which it is determined that a creditor has
violated this section, in addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 ...
for violations ... not relating to the right to rescind.").
165. Some plaintiffs in TILA declaration-of-rescindability cases apparently already have
recognized this concern-the majority of cases seeking 23(b)(2) rescission concern an obscured
right to rescind. See In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 05-CV-
7097, 2007 WL 1202544 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2007); Gibbons v. Interbank Funding Grp., 208
F.R.D. 278 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428 (E.D. Pa.
1998). But see Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Wis. 2007), rev'd, 545
F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (seeking 23(b)(2) certification for misleading loan terms); LaLiberte v.
Pac. Mercantile Bank, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 746 (Ct. App. 2007) (seeking 23(b)(2) certification
for failure to disclose a $450 closing fee). The majority of cases seeking 23(b)(3) certification, on
the other hand, almost entirely have been cases where the lender incorrectly disclosed material
terms relating to the cost of the loan. See Murray v. Am.'s Mortg. Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03
C 6186, 2005 WL 1323364 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005); McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co.,
215 F.R.D. 26 (D. Mass. 2003); Jefferson v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 63 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Hickey v. Great W. Mortg. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. 111. 1994). But see McKenna v.
First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2006), rev'd, 475 F.3d 418 (1st
Cir. 2007) (seeking 23(b)(3) for receipt of a misleading right to cancel); Rodrigues v. Members
Mortg. Co., Inc., 226 F.R.D. 147 (D. Mass. 2005) (same).
166. ROSSMAN & DELBAUM, supra note 135, § 9.4.4.3, at 132.
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approach has the advantage of deferring the added costs of 23(b)(3)
actions until a liability determination has been made, thereby making
otherwise cost-prohibitive 23(b)(3) actions more feasible.' Under
this model, borrowers affected by inadequate TILA disclosures of
any sort could pursue equitable relief both as a tool for enjoining the
lender's continued use of the forms and as a preliminary
determination of liability. While damages could later be sought by
those plaintiffs with disclosure violations unrelated to the right to
rescind, the 23(b)(2) declaration's sole purpose is not to lay the basis
for future relief. Instead, any future damages actions could be seen as
incidental actions that plaintiffs could bring if they were both entitled
to damages and had not surpassed the one-year statute of limitations.
In sum, plaintiffs seeking a declaration of rescindability for
lender-disclosure errors generally meet all of the requisite procedural
requirements for bringing a class-action suit in federal court. When
lenders fail to disclose the information statutorily required by TILA,
they cause an injury in fact for which the borrowers may seek
redress. Borrowers generally fulfill the class certification
requirements of both Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The extent of
court discretion in refusing to certify such classes should properly be
limited to whether the plaintiff class has sought the appropriate Rule
23 class certification for the specific type of TILA-disclosure error
the class seeks to redress.
CONCLUSION
TILA class actions for a declaration of rescindability may-and
should-be certified as long as the procedural prerequisites are met.
If class-wide declarations of rescindability become unworkable or
invite rampant abuse, the separation of powers doctrine dictates that
Congress, not the judiciary, has the duty to address any perceived
flaws in TILA's statutory language. Court involvement in TILA class
actions should properly be limited to monitoring class certification to
ensure that plaintiff-borrowers have standing and meet the proper
Rule 23 class-certification requirements. Courts may acknowledge
any statutory ambiguities, but must interpret TILA consistent with its
language and, if necessary, legislative history and intent. Courts
should not, however, entirely preclude the class-action device for
167. Id.
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TILA-rescission actions based on an overly broad and largely
unjustified concern for lender resources, especially when the plain
language of the statute, legislative history, and legislative intent are
consistent with allowing TILA class actions for a declaration of
rescindability.
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